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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question is straightforward: does California’s ban on campaign 
contributions from lobbyists violate the First Amendment?1 The answer is not 
straightforward. The purpose of this Comment is to assess the validity of 
California’s ban on the changes made to campaign finance law by the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice John Roberts.2 The Chief Justice has authored several 
decisions that diverted the course of campaign finance law through constitutional 
interpretations that will likely overwhelm California’s justifications for the ban.3 
In 2000, California enacted Government Code § 85702, barring lobbyists 
from contributing to an elected state officer or candidate for state office if the 
lobbyist is registered to lobby the officer’s government agency.4 In 2001, the only 
time § 85702 was litigated, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
California found the ban to be constitutional on First Amendment grounds.5 The 
plaintiffs did not appeal the decision, and the court’s ruling remains the only case 
law on the ban.6 
Questioning the vitality of the ban is important because unrestricted political 
speech is an indispensable element of democratic self-governance.7 At the end of 
California’s 2015 legislative session, the state had nearly 1,800 registered 
lobbyists.8 If the ban was challenged today, the outcome may be markedly 
different.9 Since Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Supreme Court in 2005, 
campaign finance limitations have been dramatically struck down as 
unconstitutional.10 California’s voters enacted the ban near the end of the 
Rehnquist Court, when decisions like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; M.P.P., 
California State University Monterey Bay, 2011; B.A., Political Science, University of California, Davis, 2007; 
A.A., English, Las Positas College, 2005. Foremost, much love to my family, my spouse Meghann and our 
children Baylee and Abrielle, for supporting me throughout my academic career. Many thanks to the law review 
editors for their help on this publication, and to Professor Nicolas Heidorn for his invaluable input on the 
subject matter. 
1. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015). 
2. Infra Part I. 
3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014). 
4. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015). 
5. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. 
CA 2001). 
6. Id. 
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). 
8. Jim Miller, Number of California Lobbyists Grows Over Past Decade, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 11, 
2015, 5:02 PM), available at http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article34953855. 
html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9. Infra Part V. 
10.  See Ann Southworth, The Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court: 
A Research Agenda, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2015) (describing the precedent-upsetting impact of 
Citizens United and the less-appreciated holding of McCutcheon). 
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and McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee stymied a broad threat of 
corporate influence in elections and upheld restrictions on the political speech of 
corporations.11 However, the Roberts Court overturned parts of Austin and 
McConnell in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee and McCutcheon 
v. Federal Elections Committee, downplaying the threat of potential corruption 
caused by corporate monies in elections.12 If challenged today, California’s ban 
on lobbyist campaign contributions would likely be held unconstitutional as an 
overbroad restriction that neither respects lobbyists’ personal political interests, 
nor responds to threats of actual or perceived corruption.13 
Part II of this Comment presents background information on campaign 
contribution bans.14 Part II opens with a review of different forms of absolute 
bans and why the bans were upheld or struck down.15 Decisions addressing bans 
on contributions from federal contractors, minors, and foreign nationals are used 
as illustrations.16 Part II discusses the background on lobbyist contribution bans.17 
A descriptive legislative history of California’s ban is provided, as well as brief 
surveys about similar bans in other states.18 The other states’ bans and related 
case law are provided as a comparative study for best (and worst) practices.19 
Finally, Part II concludes with a review of Alaska’s ban on campaign 
contributions by lobbyists except for contributions to candidates that the lobbyist 
may vote for.20 Alaska’s model is proposed as a possible alternative to 
California’s current ban.21 
Part III of the Comment surveys the shifting judicial precedent of campaign 
finance challenges.22 Prior to Chief Justice Roberts, the Court tended to vote 5-4 
in favor of contribution limitations; however, the Court shifted under Roberts, 
tending to vote 5-4 against limitations.23 The first section of Part III reviews 
 
11. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (finding the state’s authority to 
regulate a corporation’s independent expenditures was justified because the corporate structure allowing wealth 
accumulation was conferred by the state), and McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137-42, 
153–54 (2003) (applying the “closely drawn” standard of review, the Court found Congress’ conclusion that 
corruption is broader than quid pro quo transactions). 
12. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014). 
13. Infra Part V. 
14. Infra Part II. 
15. Infra Part II. 
16. Infra Part II. 
17. Infra Part II. 
18. Infra Part II. 
19. Infra Part II. 
20. Infra Part II. 
21. Infra Part II. 
22. Infra Part III. 
23. Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but 
with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-70 at 5, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2639902 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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relevant pre-Roberts Supreme Court authority.24 This section includes an analysis 
of the standards of review applied by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo and what 
factors influence the Court’s level of scrutiny.25 The second section of Part III 
assesses the current trend against campaign finance limitations promulgated by 
the Roberts’ court.26 The third section of Part III explores the Roberts Court’s use 
of the avoidance doctrine and how the Court seems to offer “one last chance” 
before issuing a significant change of law.27 The fourth and final section of Part 
III reviews relevant campaign finance decisions from the 9th Circuit and focuses 
on the Circuit’s adoption and interpretation of Citizens United.28 
Part IV analyzes limits on nonresident campaign contributions.29 This Part is 
relatively short due to the dearth of scholarship on the issue.30 Case law suggests 
that limiting nonresident campaign contributions is only appropriate when non-
geographic factors increase the likelihood that the contribution may be 
corruptive.31 
Part V proposes to revise California’s ban on lobbyist contributions.32 This 
Part opens by exposing constitutional and practical infirmities with the ban’s 
current implementation.33 The ban will be highlighted as an ineffective 
prophylactic because of an ironic development—lobbyists prefer the ban because 
elected officials do not hassle them for contributions.34 This Part proposes to 
reform the ban to be more similar to Alaska’s limitation.35 Prohibiting lobbyists 
from contributing to any candidate except those the lobbyist may vote for is a 
respectful balance between preventing corruption and protecting First 
Amendment rights.36 
II. BACKGROUND ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS & BANS 
Political operatives are using the perceived negative effects of Citizens 
United on California’s campaign finance regulations to drive electoral turnout.37 
 
24. Infra Part III. 
25. Infra Part III. 
26. Infra Part III. 
27. Infra Part III. 
28. Infra Part III. 
29. Infra Part IV. 
30. Infra Part IV. 
31. Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 157–58 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
32. Infra Part V. 
33. Infra Part V. 
34. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999). 
35. Infra Part V. 
36. Infra Part V. 
37. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, ‘Citizens United’ advisory measure can go on ballot, California high court 
says, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-
supreme-court-ballot-20160104-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting 
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Even Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author of Citizens United, lamented that the 
campaign finance reform anticipated by the Court is “not working the way it 
should.”38 The corruptive influence of money in politics prompted limitations to 
campaign contributions.39 And these limits are constitutionally-justified as a 
legitimate means to combat actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption.40 This 
Part is divided into four sections: the first covers absolute bans; the second, 
temporal bans; the third surveys state-level bans on lobbyist contributions; and 
the fourth is an in-depth analysis of Alaska’s lobbyist contribution ban. 41 
Alaska’s ban serves as the model for the revisions to California’s ban.42 
A. Absolute Bans on Campaign Contributions 
The Supreme Court’s vigorous protection of free speech principles extends to 
campaign contributions.43 The Court is more likely to strike down absolute bans 
on contributions than it is to strike down a mitigated contribution limitation.44 In 
McConnell, the Court found a ban on contributions from minors to be 
unconstitutional.45 The Court did not accept the government’s assertions that 
minors should not be allowed to contribute simply because minors could serve as 
a conduit for parents to circumvent contributions limits.46 Absolute bans are 
generally upheld when matters of sovereign importance are at stake.47 
B. Temporal Bans on Campaign Contributions 
To reduce the occurrence or appearance of corruption, a dozen states have 
banned legislators and candidates from receiving campaign contributions while 
the state legislature is in session.48 These bans typically prohibit legislators from 
 
that a Citizens United-specific ballot measure would fan Democratic voter turnout because of the opinion’s 
polarizing effect). 
38. Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy visits HLS, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHbMPnA5n0Q (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
40. Id. 
41. Infra Part II.A–C. 
42. Infra Part II.D. 
43. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
44. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126–27 (2003). 
45. Id. at 231–33. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding ban on 
contributions from federal contractors on the basis that the government’s administration needs to be seen as 
impartial); Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp.2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding a ban on 
contributions from foreign nationals). 
48. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-35 (2015); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 430/5-
40 (2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-9-2-12 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(Q) (2015); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. 
LAW § 13-235 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.300 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (2015); TEX. 
2016 / Lobbyists Are People Too 
118 
accepting contributions during the legislative session, as well as thirty to sixty 
days before and after the legislative session.49 
These temporal bans are easily subverted in practice and difficult to defend 
in litigation.50 State-level bans are preempted by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA) and do not apply to federal elections held in the state.51 FECA’s 
preemptive force causes a conundrum—during a legislative session, a state 
legislator cannot accept contributions for reelection, but the legislator can accept 
contributions for Congressional election.52 When litigated, the temporal bans are 
typically found to be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.53 The 
restriction on free speech caused by temporal bans has been deemed 
unconstitutional when the ban is applied to both incumbents and candidates54 and 
also when applied only to incumbents.55 Temporal bans are upheld when the ban 
is limited to a qualified group of contributors.56 Thus, the narrowness of a ban 
directly correlates with the likelihood that the ban will be upheld.57 
C. Bans on Lobbyist Contributions 
Over a dozen states implemented limits on campaign contributions from 
lobbyists to public officials.58 These limits are designed to stave corruption, and 
 
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2015); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.560 (2015). 
49. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.300 (2015) (barring contributions and solicitations from 30 
days before to 30 days after a regular session). 
50. See Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding a temporal ban equally 
affecting legislators and non-incumbent challengers to be unconstitutional as a method that was not the least 
restrictive means of preventing corruption or its appearance), and Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 
29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding a temporal ban to be unconstitutional because it barred 
small and large contributions alike despite “only large contributions pos[ing] a threat of corruption.”). 
51. 52 U2.S.C. § 30143 (2015). 
52. See, e.g., Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 999 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that FECA preempts state law 
on the matter of campaign contributions to federal campaigns), and Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 1992-43 (Jan. 
28, 1993) (explaining the FEC’s opinion that FEC regulation on FECA preempts state law on the matter of 
contributions to federal campaigns). 
53. Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140, 140 (Mo. 2007). 
54. Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). 
55. Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998). 
56. North Carolina Right to Life v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th. Cir 1999). 
57. Id. 
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2015); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-45-105.5 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-610 (2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.504 
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.1 
§ 1015(3) (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.273 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13B (2015); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §187.1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-80 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 266(3) (2015); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 13.625 (2015). 
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they benefit lobbyists and legislators alike.59 In states that allow lobbyists to 
contribute to legislators, lobbyists believe that failing to make contributions 
adversely affects their performance.60 Their performance is affected by their 
potential loss of access to the legislator.61 Legislators benefit from the ban if the 
public’s perception of a corrupt atmosphere in the legislature is diminished.62 
Most states that ban lobbyist contributions to legislators and other public 
officials temporally limit the ban to apply only during the legislative session.63 
Temporal lobbyist contribution bans from Vermont64 and North Carolina were 
both upheld.65 These bans were upheld specifically because the temporal limits 
did not absolutely prohibit lobbyists from contributing to legislators and public 
officials.66 The bans were found to be constitutional because their impact was 
narrowed to “avoid a serious appearance of impropriety”67 and covered only “that 
period during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo or the appearance of one 
runs highest.”68 
Other states, however, do not temporally limit the lobbyist contribution ban.69 
Like California, lobbyists in Kentucky and South Carolina are completely barred 
from making contributions to legislators.70 However, unlike California’s ban, the 
bans in Kentucky and South Carolina have not been litigated. The 2nd Circuit 
held Connecticut’s statute banning lobbyist contributions unconstitutional in 
2010.71 The 2nd Circuit found that fear of the prospect of quid pro quo corruption 
was not a sufficient state interest to abridge First Amendment rights.72 
 
59. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999) (explaining why 
lobbyists are pressured to contribute), and Green Party v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d. 298, 308 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(explaining why the legislature’s optics are improved by a ban on lobbyist contributions). 
60. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 618. 
61. Id. 
62. Green Party v. Garfield, 648 F.Supp.2d at 308. 
63. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2015) (barring the acceptance of contributions during 
the regular legislative session except for those received during the first three days of the session postmarked 
before the first day of the session), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.1 § 1015(3) (2015) (barring contributions 
“during any period of time in which the Legislature is convened before final adjournment,” except for 
contributions relating to special elections). 
64. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. 80, 80 (1995). 
65. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999). 
66. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. at 91 (1995); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 
716 (1999). 
67. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. at 91. 
68. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716. 
69. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015) (barring the acceptance of contributions from 
lobbyists, but allowing the legislator a complete defense if the legislator returns the donation within 30 days of 
acceptance and then duly informs the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
17-80 (2015) (barring lobbyists from giving campaign contributions to legislators, except for “emergency 
assistance given gratuitously and in good faith” and “anything of value given to a family member for love and 
affection.”). 
70. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-80 (2015). 
71. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 2010). 
72. Id. at 207 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
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D. Alaska Model 
Alaska bans lobbyists from making campaign contributions except to those 
candidates the lobbyist could vote for in the relevant state election.73 For 
example, a lobbyist living in downtown Juneau, who is represented by Alaska 
House of Representatives District 33 and Senate District Q,74 could contribute 
only to candidates of those two districts.75 Theoretically, if the lobbyist planned to 
move and reside in a new district before an election, the lobbyist could contribute 
to the candidates in both the current and anticipated districts.76 
Alaska’s ban became effective in 1997, and the Alaska Civil Liberties Union 
(AKCLU) promptly challenged it as an unconstitutional infringement of 
associational freedoms under the First Amendment.77 The AKCLU argued that a 
lobbyist could not corrupt a legislator with a contribution because individual 
contributions were limited at no more than $500 for legislative campaigns.78 The 
AKCLU did not challenge the ban on equal protection grounds.79 
In upholding the ban, the Supreme Court of Alaska found it to be “a logical 
compromise between lobbyists’ private rights and their professional 
obligations.”80 The Court emphasized how the “special role” of lobbyists in the 
legislative process gives rise to perceived corruption when lobbyists contribute to 
a large number of legislators.81 Lobbyists, the Court reasoned, must contribute 
broadly to protect their professional interests.82 
But, the Court also reasoned that lobbyists are people too, with private rights 
and political interests deserving of protection.83 Alaska’s Supreme Court upheld 
the ban because it found the allowance for in-district contributions to be a 
tailored recognition that the perception of corruption ends when professional 
interests fail to outweigh personal interests.84 The Supreme Court of the United 
States denied the petition for a writ of certiorari for this case.85 
 
73. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.13.074(g) (West 2015). 
74. Alaska Division of Elections, Proclamation of Redistricting (July 14, 2013). 
75. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.13.074(g) (West 2015). 
76. Id. (“[T]he individual may make a contribution under this section to a candidate for the legislature in a 
district in which the individual is eligible to vote or will be eligible to vote on the date of the election.”). 
77. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 619. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 619–620. 
85. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153, 1157 (2000). 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Litigation involving campaign contribution bans and First Amendment 
questions are generally reviewed under the “closely drawn” standard 
promulgated in Buckley v. Valeo.86 Contribution bans and limitations are 
evaluated under different levels of scrutiny within the “closely drawn” standard.87 
In one case involving California’s ban on lobbyist contributions, the Court found 
the ban narrowly tailored because the prohibition only applied if the lobbyist was 
registered to lobby the office of the candidate or incumbent.88 
The Court’s analyses of First Amendment challenges to campaign finance 
restrictions are rooted in Buckley. Buckley’s import cannot be dismissed despite 
vocal opposition that Buckley “denigrates core First Amendment speech and 
should be overruled.”89 Buckley established different levels of review for 
independent expenditures and contributions, a distinction akin to “two sides of 
the same First Amendment coin.”90 The Roberts Court slowly narrowed the 
distinction by preserving the protections afforded to expenditures and reviewing 
contribution limitations with a greater level of scrutiny.91 
A. Pre-Roberts Precedent 
Buckley’s effect on the lobbyist contribution ban is found in a gradient of 
distinctions.92 Campaign expenditures are the most protected form of campaign 
speech because they represent “the quantity of expression.”93 Campaign 
contributions are less protected because the speech is a symbolic gesture of 
support.94 The Roberts Court is aware that the symbolic nature of contributions 
dampers the constitutional concerns raised by contribution Limitations.95 
Contribution limits that jeopardize a person’s associational freedoms are more 
likely to withstand First Amendment scrutiny than content-based restrictions.96 
 
86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). 
87. Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 US 146, 162 (2003). 
88. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190–91 
(E.D. CA 2001). 
89. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
91. Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day - The Supreme Court takes a big step closer to gutting the last 
bits of campaign finance reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news 
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_the_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_deci
sion_the.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
92. Infra Part III.A. 
93. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). 
94. Id. at 21. 
95. Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 US 146, 162-63 (2003). 
96. Id. 
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Because contribution limits affect associational freedoms, a more lenient 
“closely drawn” standard of review is employed to assess contribution limits.97 
The Roberts Court invited interpretations that general characteristics of the 
affected contributors may inform the “closely drawn” standard.98 As an initial 
inquiry, the contributor’s person must be examined for suspect characteristics 
that justify a ban.99 That is, is the ban in place because of a threatening 
characteristic of the lobbyist as a person, or because the lobbyist is compensated 
for direct advocacy?100 Once the relational aspect of the ban and the lobbyist is 
confirmed, then the ban must be assessed under the appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny.101 
The contributor’s personhood is a crucial threshold inquiry when determining 
the constitutionality of campaign contribution bans.102 If the person has a 
compromising characteristic that allows the government more leeway to restrict 
the person’s rights, then it is more likely that a ban will be upheld.103 For 
example, in Bluman v. Federal Elections Commission, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, which found bans on contributions from 
foreign nationals to be constitutional.104 The district court in Bluman emphasized 
that foreign citizens may be denied privileges granted to U.S. citizens, especially 
those privileges “intimately related to the processes of democratic self-
government.”105 And in Wagner v. Federal Elections Commission, the D.C. Court 
of Appeals found a ban on contributions from U.S. citizens hired as federal 
contractors to be constitutional.106 The Court in Wagner relied on precedent, 
which permitted greater restriction of speech for government employees than the 
public at large.107 
 
97. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2015). 
98. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57 (2014) (vacillating on whether 
fit should be reasonable or perfect and admitting that the appropriate scope depends on the interest served). 
99. See, e.g, Bluman v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 283–285 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding a 
ban on federal contributions from foreign nationals), and Wagner v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 10–12 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding a ban on federal contributions from federal contractors). 
100. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (noting how the ends may justify the means if the end is 
appropriate). 
101. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345–346 (1995) (detailing how the issue 
being litigated must be assessed to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny). 
102. See Bluman, 800 F.Supp.2d at 283–85 (explaining why contributions from foreign nationals to 
election campaigns are barred by federal statute while those same persons may contribute to issue advocacy 
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103. See Wagner, 793 F.3d at 10–12 (explaining the history of federal employment-based campaign 
contribution limits and bans). 
104. Bluman v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 132 S.Ct. 1087, 1087 (2015). 
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B. Roberts Court’s Granular Scrutiny for Contributions 
In 2003’s FEC v. Beaumont, the last major campaign finance case before 
Roberts joined the Court, the Court articulated that both contribution bans and 
limitations were scrutinized at the same “closely drawn” standard of review.108 
The Court held that bans and limitations are not treated differently because they 
both address the same political activity—campaign contributions.109 Justice 
Thomas, writing in dissent and joined by Justice Scalia, flatly argued that any 
campaign finance law should be subject to strict scrutiny and any “broad 
prophylactic caps” on contributions are unconstitutional.110 
In 2005, during Roberts’ confirmation hearings, Senator Sam Brownback 
pointedly asked Roberts whether it was odd that some campaign contribution 
restrictions were upheld as unconstitutional and others were not.111 Roberts 
demurred, “ . . . political speech is generally regarded as at the core of what the 
First Amendment was designed to protect, and some of the other speeches is 
not. . . . [W]hether the particular cases were correctly decided or not is not 
something I feel is appropriate for me to discuss.”112 Now that Roberts is on the 
Court, he has made it clear that he believes some cases were wrongly decided.113 
In 2010, in Citizens United, the Court refused to conflate expenditures and 
contributions.114 The Court also refused to “reconsider whether contribution limits 
should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”115 However, the 
rationales in Citizens United undercut Beaumont’s strong holding.116 For example, 
Citizens United incorporated part of Justice Scalia’s dissent from Austin,117 
holding that the state’s act of conferring advantages to persons or corporations 
does not then allow the state to prohibit speech of that person or corporation.118 
Additionally, Citizens United clarified and narrowed the sufficient 
government interest in quid pro quo arrangements.119 The government’s interest 
lies in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, not in preventing 
the appearance of influence or access to elected officials.120 Although Citizens 
United seemingly undercut the strong holding in Beaumont, the Court has denied 
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certiorari for two cases attempting to overturn Beaumont by way of Citizens 
United.121 
In 2014, the Supreme Court’s McCutcheon decision came close to 
eviscerating Beaumont by requiring a more rigorous standard of review, but 
Justice Thomas concurred only in judgment and did not join Roberts’ opinion, 
leading to a 4-1-4 decision.122 McCutcheon sidestepped resolving the different 
standards of review for expenditures and contributions; instead, it focused on the 
law’s fit relative to the government’s stated objective.123 The Court reframed the 
appropriate fit and effectively gave rise to a more demanding level of review: “if 
a law that restricts political speech does not ‘avoid unnecessary abridgement’ of 
First Amendment rights it cannot survive ‘rigorous’ review.”124 McCutcheon’s 
emphasis on fit strikes directly at Beaumont’s holding that a contributor “cannot 
prevail, then, simply by arguing that a ban . . . is bad tailoring.”125 The Court later 
admitted to deliberately avoiding the question of the proper standard of review in 
McCutcheon.126 The Court chose to “assume, without deciding, that a law is 
subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny. . . .”127 The Roberts Court’s decision 
to purposely avoid deciding the proper standard of review in McCutcheon is 
perplexing but not surprising.128 As explained in the next section, the Roberts 
Court seems to prefer legislative fixes over judicial activism.129 
C. Would the Roberts Court Avoid a Decision on the Constitutionality of 
California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions? 
The “avoidance canon” is a traditional interpretative canon that “encourages 
a court to adopt one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to 
avoid deciding a tough constitutional question.”130 The Supreme Court used the 
canon as a diplomatic tool to allow Congress to fix a problematic statute through 
the legislative process rather than finding the statute to be technically 
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unconstitutional.131 The Court’s willingness to engage—rather than provoke—
Congress is consistent with the Court’s stated disfavor of facial challenges.132 
An emerging pattern of the Roberts Court shows the Chief’s willingness to 
tackle facial challenges after the Court signals a “one last chance” to fix the 
constitutional infirmity.133 Relevant here, for example, is the downfall of § 203 of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended FECA 
§ 316(b)(2) to ban corporate entities from using general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications.134 In the 2003 
McConnell decision, the pre-Roberts Court upheld the facial constitutionality of 
FECA § 316(b)(2) as amended by BCRA § 203.135 The Court deferred to 
Congress’s discretion, relying on the legislative history of § 203 to find that 
Congress knew “corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual 
torrent of [ads] . . . and that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow 
of money.”136 However, the McConnell decision did not foreclose as-applied 
challenges to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203.137 
In 2006, BCRA § 203 came under attack again, but this time before the 
Roberts Court in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II).138 WRTL II involved 
another challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203 and the holding in 
McConnell. 139 Rather than upsetting BCRA and the precedent in McConnell, the 
Court avoided a facial constitutional challenge by finding that BCRA § 203 was 
unconstitutional as applied.140 The 5-4 opinion examples the “one last chance” 
doctrine of the Roberts Court, hinting that McConnell may be overturned if 
BCRA § 203 is subject to another facial challenge.141 
The 2010 Citizens United decision addressed the facial challenge to BCRA 
§ 203 four years after McConnell.142 The Citizens United decision overruled the 
basis for McConnell and, thus, found BCRA § 203 could not be upheld.143 The 
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ominous warnings in WRTL II spelled certain doom for McConnell and BCRA 
§ 203.144 
As discussed earlier, the Court in McCutcheon chose to “assume, without 
deciding, that a law is subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny. . . .”145 Viewed 
through the lens of “one last chance,” the Court’s purposeful and avowed 
avoidance of deciding the necessity of a higher level of scrutiny is telling.146 
Justice Scalia, no fan of giving Congress one last chance to fix infirm legislation, 
called the practice “faux judicial restraint.”147 
But if the Court was primed to require a higher level of scrutiny for 
contribution limits, Justice Scalia’s unexpected passing may have stopped the 
momentum.148 Justice Scalia’s notorious originalist principles are apparent in his 
campaign finance opinions where he distinguished himself as a thought leader for 
reformers and opponents because of his opposition to campaign finance 
deregulation and his support of enhanced campaign disclosures.149 A stalwart for 
deregulating campaign finance limits, Justice Scalia believed that the First 
Amendment does not discriminate against speakers or types of speech.150 As a 
champion of campaign finance disclosures, he intimated that the only thing better 
than more speech was more truthful speech.151 Justice Scalia joined the majority 
in McConnell, WRTL II, and Citizens United, and the plurality in McCutcheon, 
four decisions that primed the Court to apply strict scrutiny for campaign 
contributions.152 
D. 9th Circuit Precedent 
The Roberts Court slowly moved campaign finance law to the right, and the 
shift in policy is being embraced by California and the 9th Circuit.153 The 9th 
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Circuit employs a synthesized test to gauge the validity of campaign contribution 
limits.154 Using the Court’s precedent from Buckley and its progeny, the 9th 
Circuit developed the Eddleman test in 2003: 
“[S]tate campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is 
adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important 
state interest, and (2) if the limits are closely drawn—i.e., if they (a) 
focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free to 
affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient 
resources to wage an effective campaign.”155 
Per Eddleman, the only sufficiently important state interests are the 
prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption.156 Eddleman allows the 
interests to be broadly manifested, including the appearance of officials being 
“too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”157 The improper 
compliance could be demonstrated by the contributors’ access to or influence 
over the politician.158 
Finding corruption where access and influence are prevalent is problematic 
because there is no way to quantify how much access or influence is improper.159 
In Citizens United, the Court held that only the prevention of quid pro quo 
corruption was a sufficiently important state interest in preventing corruption or 
its appearance.160 The Court expressly rejected the proposition that the First 
Amendment would allow a contribution limitation to further the state’s interest in 
limiting a contributor’s access or influence.161 
Citizens United is squarely at odds with the Eddleman standard of allowing a 
limitation of access or influence as a sufficiently important state interest.162 The 
effect of Citizens United on Eddleman’s campaign contribution analysis is 
apparent in light of Citizens United’s effect on independent expenditure 
limitations.163 The 9th Circuit and other circuit courts recognized Citizens 
United’s narrowing effect on the analysis for a sufficiently important state 
interest in the context of independent expenditures.164 Independent expenditures 
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are purportedly not corrupting because they are neither given to nor controlled by 
the candidate.165 A tenuous link between independent expenditures and candidates 
makes it less likely that corruption would arise from the expenditure.166 
Campaign contributions are a far more direct way to influence candidates 
than independent expenditures because candidates may direct the expenditure of 
campaign funds.167 The 9th Circuit found Citizens United abrogated Eddleman’s 
“important state interest” analysis because hampering influence was no longer 
recognized as a sufficient state interest.168 Although decreasing the influence of 
donors cannot be a sufficient state interest to justify a contribution limitation, a 
sufficient interest can be found by reframing a limitation as a means to prevent 
corruption.169 
IV. THE NARROW CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR LIMITING NONRESIDENT 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
Limiting nonresident campaign contributions is acceptable in narrow 
circumstances where non-geographic factors increase the likelihood that the 
nonresident’s contribution may be corruptive.170 This section presents a current 
dispute over nonresident limitations in Austin, Texas, and then explains how the 
loss of the anti-distortion rationale severely jeopardizes nonresident limitations.171 
The City of Austin restricts the aggregate amount of campaign contributions 
to city council candidates from persons living in a postal zip code outside of city 
limits.172 Austin’s restriction on nonresident contributions has been challenged as 
an unconstitutional burden on associational freedom that fails to advance a 
cognizable quid pro quo interest.173 The case, Zimmerman v. City of Austin, went 
to trial in December 2015 and is awaiting a decision.174 Austin’s defense of the 
nonresident restriction relies on oblique reasoning: the city cites to a finding in 
the voting rights case Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa that, “our cases have 
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uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to 
participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders.”175 
But the justification for the finding in Holt Civic Club undermines its benefit 
as a defense in Zimmerman.176 The Court premised its finding in Holt Civic Club 
on the need for a bright line rule to determine when voters could be enfranchised 
in a municipal election.177 The Court found that predictable boundaries better 
served the public’s interest than voting rights for nonresidents potentially 
affected by municipal elections.178 In Zimmerman, the City of Austin’s failure to 
absolutely prohibit nonresident contributions effectively favored earlier 
contributors whose contributions fall below the aggregate cap.179 Additionally, at 
dispute in Holt Civic Club were Fourteenth Amendment voter 
disenfranchisement concerns—the “talismanic significance” of geographic 
boundaries in voting cases has no direct bearing on First Amendment disputes.180 
The City of Austin may have cited to Holt Civic Club because, based on 
more analogous cases, it is unlikely that the City of Austin’s geographic ban will 
withstand constitutional scrutiny because such bans are usually justified on anti-
distortion grounds.181 In Whitmore v. FEC, a Green Party congressional candidate 
claimed that her competitors’ acceptance of out-of-state contributions endangered 
the home state’s republican government.182 The 9th Circuit found no sufficient 
state interest in insulating a state government from out-of-state interests because 
the First Amendment does not allow tempering the speech of one faction to 
enhance the speech of a competing faction.183 A few years later, the 9th Circuit 
confirmed that protecting a republican form of government is an insufficient state 
interest.184 
In Vannatta v. Keisling, Oregon used this interest to justify a ban on out-of-
district contributions.185 Oregon also justified the ban as a necessary means to 
prevent corruption.186 Importantly, the 9th Circuit failed to find that out-of-district 
contributions could not be adequately corrupting to give rise to a sufficient state 
interest.187 Bans on out-of-district contributions may be found sufficiently 
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“closely drawn to advance the goal of preventing corruption” if the contributions 
can be distinguished by a “factor that would tend to indicate corruption.”188 The 
9th Circuit struck down Oregon’s ban because the ban’s prevention of corrupt 
and non-corrupt contributions was too broad.189 
Vermont also attempted to damper the influence of out-of-state contributions, 
but did so by limiting the total amount of such contributions to 25 percent of a 
campaign’s total contributions.190 Vermont’s use of a limitation rather than a ban 
followed the finding in Vannatta v. Keisling that geographic bans must be 
narrowed by a factor indicative of corruption.191 Vermont claimed the 25 percent 
limitation was a necessary prophylactic against excessively large out-of-state 
contributions inundating state campaigns.192 And the state’s interest in limiting 
the size of large contributions is a bedrock defense against corruption.193 But 
Vermont’s ban did not necessarily limit large out-of-state contributions.194 Once 
the 25 percent was met, all additional contributions were banned, including 
small, non-corrupt out-of-state contributions.195 The ban on over-the-threshold 
contributions was held unconstitutional because it did nothing to prevent actual 
or perceived corruption.196 
Interestingly, similar to Vermont, Alaska limits out-of-state contributions to 
10 percent of total contributions.197 The Alaska Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s 
nonresident limitation in the same 1999 case that upheld Alaska’s lobbyist 
contribution ban.198 The nonresident limitation was explicitly upheld using anti-
distortion principles alone.199 Alaska’s limitation may be in jeopardy since anti-
distortion principles are no longer recognized as a sufficient basis for 
contribution limitations.200 The First Amendment does not protect contribution 
limits that discriminate based on geography alone.201 However, a state may 
permissibly limit nonresident contributions if such limits are adequately justified 
on an additional, corruptive characteristic.202 
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V. TAILORING CALIFORNIA’S LOBBYIST BAN TO SURVIVE A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE 
California’s voters passed a large political reform package with 2000’s 
Proposition 34 that included the ban on lobbyist contributions.203 The proponents 
of Proposition 34 declared an objective “[t]o reduce the influence of large 
contributors with an interest in matters before state government by prohibiting 
lobbyist contributions.”204 The ban on lobbyist contributions was not the hallmark 
of Proposition 34,205 and the Proposition was not introduced to combat a spate of 
quid pro quo scandals.206 But the district court’s decision to uphold the ban 
echoed the expressed purpose of diminishing lobbyist’s influence over 
politicians.207 The ban’s oblique inclusion in the proposition and the over-
emphasis on reducing lobbyist influence severely weaken the ban’s constitutional 
defenses.208 
A. Constitutional and Practical Infirmities of the Ban 
California’s ban suffers from constitutional and practical infirmities.209 The 
ban lacks a sufficient state interest to justify its enforcement.210 And it’s woeful 
tailoring leaves it vulnerable to attack.211 In some circumstances, corruption can 
seep in through the ban’s porous loopholes.212 The three infirmities are discussed 
in the following sections.213 
 
203. Text of Proposed LawCProposition 34, California Secretary of State, available at http://vigarchive. 
sos.ca.gov/2000/general/text/text-proposed-law-34.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
204. Id. 
205. Harllee Branch, Proposition 34: Limits on Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, MCGEORGE 
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE REVIEW (2000), available at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Publications/California_ 
Initiative_Review/Past_Initiatives_(Before_November_2005)/2000_November_Initiatives/Proposition_34.htm) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
206. George Skelton, Proposition 34 Offers Merely a Whiff of Reform, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2000), 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/02/news/mn-30083 (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
207. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 
(E.D. CA 2001). 
208. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
209. Infra Part V.A. 
210. Infra Part V.A.1. 
211. Infra Part V.A.2. 
212. Infra Part V.A.3. 
213. Infra Part V.A. 
2016 / Lobbyists Are People Too 
132 
1. Insufficient State Interest 
California’s interest in banning lobbyist contributions was stated in the text 
of Proposition 34: “[t]o reduce the influence of large contributors.”214 But 
reducing influence alone is an insufficient state interest to support a contribution 
limitation.215 California’s interest in the ban would have to specifically target acts 
of quid pro quo corruption perpetuated by lobbyists to qualify as a sufficient state 
interest.216 But the voters did not pass the ban in response to a corruption scandal 
or any other actual or apparent acts of corruption by lobbyists.217 
Regardless, California’s lobbyists have failed to comply with the ban.218 
Former lawmakers-turned-lobbyists violated the ban,219 as have lobbyists for 
simply purchasing refreshments for a political fundraiser.220 Most notably, the 
Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) fined a lobbyist over $100,000 for 
repeatedly violating the ban by hosting fundraisers for elected state officials.221 
Despite the ban being violated a handful of times, none of the offending acts 
involved actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.222 At best, the offending acts 
involved attempts to influence or access elected officials.223 
The constitutional infirmity of the ban is underscored when its history and its 
outcomes are compared.224 The fear of improper influence or access does not give 
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rise to a sufficient state interest to properly limit campaign contributions.225 The 
glaring absence of bribery scandals coupled with the statutory purpose to curb the 
influence of lobbyists leaves the ban vulnerable to attack.226 
2. The Ban is Insufficiently Tailored 
California’s ban was upheld as narrowly tailored because it allowed 
contributions to all candidates except those whom the lobbyist is registered to 
lobby, and it could not be temporally-limited due to the year-round nature of the 
California legislature.227 The Court found the ban sufficiently narrow even though 
it could be “more narrowly tailored.”228 Assuming that California can sufficiently 
demonstrate the need to ban lobbyist contributions,229 the ban must not 
unnecessarily restrict non-corrupt contributions.230 Contributions that may be 
political expressions of personal belief are far less likely to be corrupting than 
expressions made for professional gain.231 
The ban’s insufficient tailoring is apparent in its underinclusiveness because 
the California Senate adopted additional measures to stymy the influence of 
lobbyist employers.232 The Senate adopted a rule that prohibits “[m]embers of the 
Senate from soliciting or accepting campaign contributions from lobbyist 
employers for the period immediately preceding the passage of the state budget 
and a 30-day period preceding the end of the legislative session each year.”233 The 
Senate’s rule seems to be working better than the simple ban on lobbyist 
contributions.234 During the last 30 days of the 2015 session, the members of the 
Assembly accepted over $2.4 million in contributions.235 Members of the Senate 
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accepted only $91,000 during the same period (however, they also accepted over 
$280,000 in the week following the session’s end).236 
3. The Ban Has Loopholes 
California’s ban suffers from a common practical infirmity—loopholes 
allowing state officeholders to accept contributions for federal elections.237 State 
law on campaign contributions does not control contributions to federal 
campaigns.238 And there is no ban on lobbyist contributions to federal 
campaigns.239 Thus, California’s lobbyists are free to contribute to federal 
campaigns of state legislators and officials, even if the lobbyist could not 
contribute to the legislators’ or officials’ state campaigns.240 Exploiting the 
loophole is not merely an academic exercise.241 
While serving in the Assembly, former Assemblymember Brian Nestande 
ran for Congress in 2014 and accepted contributions from lobbyists registered to 
lobby the Assembly.242 The same occurred when former Assemblymember Jared 
Huffman ran for Congress in 2012.243 As California’s Attorney General, Kamala 
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Harris is an elected state officer.244 Attorney General Harris is running for U.S. 
Senate in 2016 and has accepted contributions from registered lobbyists.245 Due to 
FECA’s preemptive force, there is no way California can prevent state officials 
who are candidates for federal office from accepting contributions from state 
lobbyists.246 
B. Correcting the Problems of California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions 
The district court’s rationale for upholding the ban has been eroded by the 
shifting tides of the Roberts Court.247 Following the “one last chance” doctrine, 
the Roberts Court could be preparing to refine—and heighten—the scrutiny 
standard for campaign contribution limits as intimated in McCutcheon.248 If the 
Court heightens the scrutiny standard for campaign contribution limits, then 
California’s ban would likely be struck down. 
California’s ban on lobbyist contributions has constitutional infirmities and 
practical infirmities.249 First, an insufficient state interest justified the ban’s 
enactment.250 Second, the ban is not narrowly tailored—it is both overbroad and 
underinclusive.251 Finally, the ban is preempted by FECA in some instances, 
causing quirky loopholes.252 The first two problems can be corrected by amending 
the statute,253 and the third must be corrected by Congress.254 
Using the revised Eddleman test as a guide, California’s ban on lobbyist 
campaign contributions could be slightly amended and still pass constitutional 
muster.255 Primarily, the state’s interest must be limited to preventing actual or 
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apparent quid pro quo corruption.256 Fortunately and unfortunately, California is 
not plagued by bribery scandals involving lobbyists.257 The stated purpose of the 
ban as passed in Proposition 34 is, therefore, constitutionally infirm.258 
Additionally, the ban must be more narrowly tailored to not to prevent 
lobbyists from engaging in political associations that would not give rise to 
appearances of corruption.259 The ban is so ineffective that the Senate had to 
adopt additional rules to lessen the influence of special interests.260 The ban 
currently covers registered lobbyists, but it could be expanded to include owners 
or managers of lobbying firms who are not registered as lobbyists or lobbyists’ 
family members.261 The ban could also be expanded to prevent lobbyists from 
contributing to officials’ campaigns for non-statewide or non-legislative 
positions.262 
Specifically, the ban should follow Alaska’s model and include an exception 
allowing lobbyists to contribute to any candidate for legislative office for which 
the lobbyist is eligible to vote.263 The exception should not include popularly-
elected state officers (e.g., the governor, attorney general, etc.).264 Allowing 
contributions to the legislative candidates in the lobbyists’ home districts is a 
sensible balance between the states’ interest and the lobbyists’ freedoms of 
personal association.265 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
California has a reputation as a national leader in campaign finance ethics 
reform.266 But, as zealous good intentions sometimes want to do, California’s 
reforms go too far and impede individual constitutional rights.267 California’s ban 
on lobbyist contributions goes too far by prohibiting personal political 
expressions in exchange for a fictitious reduction of special interest influence.268 
Amending the ban to allow in-district contributions preserves the lobbyist’s 
opportunity to express personal political speech.269 The State Senate’s self-
imposed blackout on contributions from lobbyist employers shows that the idea 
of lobbyists-as-corruptors is a red herring.270 The real corruptors are us, we the 
people, who hire lobbyists to express our political beliefs271 and then congratulate 
ourselves when we deny lobbyists the opportunity to express their own beliefs.272 
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Harris is an elected state officer.244 Attorney General Harris is running for U.S. 
Senate in 2016 and has accepted contributions from registered lobbyists.245 Due to 
FECA’s preemptive force, there is no way California can prevent state officials 
who are candidates for federal office from accepting contributions from state 
lobbyists.246 
B. Correcting the Problems of California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions 
The district court’s rationale for upholding the ban has been eroded by the 
shifting tides of the Roberts Court.247 Following the “one last chance” doctrine, 
the Roberts Court could be preparing to refine—and heighten—the scrutiny 
standard for campaign contribution limits as intimated in McCutcheon.248 If the 
Court heightens the scrutiny standard for campaign contribution limits, then 
California’s ban would likely be struck down. 
California’s ban on lobbyist contributions has constitutional infirmities and 
practical infirmities.249 First, an insufficient state interest justified the ban’s 
enactment.250 Second, the ban is not narrowly tailored—it is both overbroad and 
underinclusive.251 Finally, the ban is preempted by FECA in some instances, 
causing quirky loopholes.252 The first two problems can be corrected by amending 
the statute,253 and the third must be corrected by Congress.254 
Using the revised Eddleman test as a guide, California’s ban on lobbyist 
campaign contributions could be slightly amended and still pass constitutional 
muster.255 Primarily, the state’s interest must be limited to preventing actual or 
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